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Abstract
In the presence of a peer-to-peer economy, the option of
sharing an item is valuable for consumers. By retaining
control over the shareability of its products a monopolist
can set a sharing tariff in conjunction with the purchase
price of the product, in order to extract state-contingent
surplus from consumers: the shareability rent. Using
an overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous
consumers, we determine the jointly optimal retail price
and sharing tariff for durable products, and quantify the
value for the control of shareability, thus defining the
firm’s financial boundary conditions for an investment
in sharing-control technologies.

1

Introduction

The degree to which software, movie subscriptions,
transportation tickets, and physical devices are shared
among peers can in principle be controlled by the producer or a seller of these items. For example, in order
to authorize an owner of an annual rail pass to share
it with another person, the ticket issuer can ask for a
fee, referred to as a “sharing tariff.” Similarly, for computer games delivered and accessed through online portals (e.g., Steam), ownership for a game could be shared
conditional on seller authorization. Even for physical
devices, such as audio studio gear (e.g., by Antelope or
United Audio), online registration may be required to
gain access, which ultimately allows the producer to retain some control over peer-to-peer sharing and transfer
of ownership. The limits of the control over the use of
an item are due mainly to budget constraints or lack of
imagination, rather than an intrinsic lack of feasibility.1
We consider here the question of how to jointly set
the product price and the sharing tariff in the presence
of a costless peer-to-peer exchange. This allows us to
quantify the value the company can extract by retaining control over the shareability of its products, which
implicitly defines the budget constraint for the technology used to monitor sharing and collect the sharing tariff. The dynamic model we use is based on recent work by Weber (2016a) which features a dynamic

sharing economy with overlapping generations of consumers (agents). The agents are heterogeneous with respect to the subjective likelihood of experiencing a need
in any given period, and with respect to the “contingent”
value for using the item when needed. The overlapping
generations provide for the coexistence of agents in different phases of their consumption lifecycle: some consumers (in an early consumption phase) decide about
ownership, while others (in a late consumption phase),
having observed their needs, choose whether or not to
participate in a sharing market.

1.1

Literature

The control of the shareability of products in a secondary market is reminiscent of market and aftermarket
control through compatibility and technological complements. Manufacturers can try to limit the interoperability of devices in an attempt to limit access
to a network and achieve customer lock-in to proprietary systems (Adams and Brock 1982; Farrell and Saloner 1992). Other options include tying the sale of
one product to the purchase of another product (Carlton
and Waldman 2002) or controlling technological complements, e.g., by requiring the use of proprietary cartridges with printers (Schulz 2015). When controlling
the shareability of an item, a producer effectively asks
for the purchase of a ‘license to share’ (i.e., a proprietary product) whenever the owner would like to ‘augment’ the use of his item by lending it out to others.
Benkler (2004) defines shareable goods as (i) technically lumpy, i.e., they provide “functionality in discrete
packages rather than in a smooth flow” (p. 277), and
(ii) systematically exhibiting “slack capacity relative to
the demand of their owners” (ibid.), i.e., there exists a
natural excess capacity of such goods. With the emergence of peer-to-peer trading platforms, such as AirBnB
or Eloue, many consumers’ preferences have been transformed to now favor access over ownership (Bardhi and
Eckhardt 2012; Nielsen 2014; Belk 2014; Weber 2015).
Sharing intermediaries have been able to solve problems
of asymmetric information (Weber 2014), fuelling the
growth of peer-to-peer exchanges (Einav et al. 2016).

1 For

instance, to restrict the use of a power drill to the original buyer, a manufacturer (or seller) could—if money is of no consideration—
require biometric recognition (e.g., via fingerprint or voice) to operate the machine.
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Sharing markets, by allowing for mutual insurance of
consumers’ ex post utilities derived from a combination of access to goods and the realization of ex ante
uncertain needs, in the spirit of Arrow (1953), can
at least partially correct for overcommitment (resp.,
undercommitment) of an individual’s resources when
(resp., not) owning a product. The economic rationality
of collaborative consumption (Felson and Spaeth 1978;
Botsman and Rogers 2010), when paired with sharing
markets, has given rise to a sharing economy which is
set to disrupt traditional modes of consumption and production. The present paper addresses the last point by
analyzing a producer’s (or retailer’s) options to use the
control of shareability for capturing secondary market
rents in a peer-to-peer sharing economy.

1.2

Outline

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Sec. 2 introduces the model primitives and establishes
the equilibrium choice behavior and market price in
an overlapping-generations economy with sharing and
nontrivial sharing tariff. Sec. 3 examines the firm’s optimal pricing strategy, including conditions for a sharing shutdown, as well as several numerical examples.
In Sec. 4, we discuss implications for product design,
and Sec. 5 concludes.

2

Model

As in Weber (2016a), we consider a sharing economy
with overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers
(or “agents”). Each consumer exists for two periods,
termed the “early consumption phase” (C0 ) and the “late
consumption phase” (C1 ), respectively. Because of the
permanent coexistence of the two consumer generations, the sharing economy operates in steady state at
times t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. The number of consumers born in
any given period t is normalized to 1, without any loss
of generality. At the end of the following period, t + 1,
these consumers exit the economy. At any time, the total number of consumers in the sharing economy is 2,
as the sum of both coexisting consumer generations in
their respective consumption phases.
The agents’ preferences for consuming a given
durable good (also referred to as “item” or “product”) are heterogeneous in the subjective likelihood of
need θ ∈ [0, 1] and in the expected use value ν ∈ [0, 1]
conditional on a realized need. The durable good may
be any rival product worth sharing,2 including subscription tickets, certain types of software (such as games),
and physical devices, to name just a few. A consumer’s
“type” is therefore specified as a point (θ, ν) in the

square Q = [0, 1]×[0, 1]. For simplicity, we assume that
the type distribution for any generation is uniform on Q.
Each consumer’s type is persistent over his lifetime. The
realizations of his need for the product are uncorrelated,
and nothing can be learned from other consumers or his
own consumption about his future demand.

2.1

Dynamic Choice

At the beginning of consumption phase Ci , any given
consumer of type (θ, ν) ∈ Q observes the realization si
of his random need state s̃i ∈ {0, 1}, which is distributed according to
Prob(s̃i = 1) = θ,
for all i ∈ {0, 1}. Contingent on a realized high need
state (si = 1), to get access to the product the agent can
either purchase it from a retailer at the price r > 0 or
borrow it on a peer-to-peer market at the sharing price p.
Regarding the latter, the right for a one-time use of the
product can be traded (i.e., acquired or relinquished) on
a sharing market where owners are asked to pay a transfer τ ≥ 0 to the firm for the authorization to rent the
good to a peer at the (nonnegative) price p < r.3 Thus,
ex ante before taking an ownership decision, a consumer
considers the product both from the perspective of his
benefits, as a function of his type (in terms of likelihood
of need and contingent consumption value), his costs,
and his opportunities ex post (in terms of p, r, τ ). The
retail price r and the sharing tariff τ are advertised with
the firm’s product offering, and p is the (via rational
expectations) correctly anticipated price in the sharing
market.
Because the price p for access in a sharing market
cannot exceed the purchase price r, ownership decisions
are taken only in the early consumption phase C0 as
long as the sharing market is active. In the event of a
sharing shutdown (see Sec. 3.2), high-value consumers
who experience a need solely in their late consumption
phase might still become owners. By contrast, with an
enabled peer-to-peer economy consumers in their late
consumption phase restrict attention to gaining and providing access to the good by taking the requisite borrowing and lending decisions on the sharing market. Given
p, r, τ such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ p ≤ r, we now analyze the
agents’ choice behavior in their two consumption phases
using backward induction for a given generation of consumers; see Fig. 1.
2.1.1

Late Consumption Phase

At the beginning of C1 , a consumer of type (θ, ν) observes the realization s1 ∈ {0, 1} of his need state s̃1 .
If he is a non-owner, then he can either not consume

2 The
3A

assumed rivalness in consumption implies that sharing the good reduces its availability to the owner.
situation where p ≥ r implies that the sharing market is inactive.
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the product at all or rent it on the sharing market at the
price p. Given his lack of consideration about the future
in his late consumption phase, renting dominates buying the product at the higher retail price r > p. For
p = r, we assume that a consumer would prefer the
residual benefits of ownership, thus leading to a shutdown of the sharing market, discussed in Sec. 3.2 below. Hence, a non-owner’s state-dependent payoff can
be written in the form

retailer at the price r to become an owner. In this case,
the individual can use the item immediately, in that same
consumption phase. Alternatively, the agent can rent the
item on the sharing market at the price p. Note that at
this early stage in his life, the agent forms an expectation
about his future utility: V̄ as owner or Ū as non-owner.
All agents discount future payoffs at the common perperiod discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1].

Us1 = max{0, νs1 − p},

Choosing the best of his three alternatives (do nothing /
i.e., all types with ν ∈ [p, 1] borrow in state s1 = 1; borrow on the sharing market / buy from the retailer) an
otherwise, non-owners do nothing. Before delving into agent’s discounted state-dependent total payoff is
the details of the analysis, we introduce
Ts0 = max{δ Ū , νs0 − p + δ Ū , νs0 − r + δ V̄ },
p̂ , p − τ,

where Ū = (1 − θ)U0 + θU1 and V̄ = (1 − θ)V0 + θV1 ,
and where Ui , Vi , for i ∈ {0, 1}, are given by La. 1.
Combining the first two decision options yields the total
expected payoff of non-ownership,

as the effective transaction price for lenders in the
sharing market; it represents the net rent (or absolute
markup) of a supplier in the sharing market. Indeed, if
the consumer is an owner, then he has the option to keep
(s0 + δθ) max{0, ν − p},
the item for his own use or else pay τ to the firm to lend
it out at the price p, with the state-dependent net payoff which needs to be compared against the total expected
payoff of ownership,
Vs1 = max{νs1 , p̂},

νs0 − r + δ p̂ + θ max{0, ν − p̂} ,
i.e., all types with ν ∈ [0, p̂) lend in state s1 = 1, and
all types with ν ∈ (0, 1] lend in state s1 = 0; otherwise, separately for the agents’ possible current need states.
In the low-need state, s0 = 0, consider first indiowners take no action. The following result summarizes
viduals
with contingent consumption values ν ≥ p (and
the state-contingent payoffs in C1 .
therefore also ν ≥ p̂). Of those, agents with likelihood
Lemma 1. A type-(θ, ν) agent’s C1 -payoffs are U0 = type
r − δ p̂
0, U1 = max{0, ν − p} as non-owner, and V0 =
, ϑ01
θ≥
max{0, p̂}, V1 = max{ν, p̂} as owner, respectively.
δτ
would purchase the product. For contingent consumpThe payoff difference between owner and nontion values ν ∈ (p̂, p), agents with likelihood type
owner in the low-need state, s1 = 0, is
r − δ p̂
θ≥
, ϑ00
V0 − U0 = max{0, p̂},
δ(ν − p̂)
while in the high-need state, s1 = 1, it is

 p̂, if ν < p̂,
ν, if ν ∈ [p̂, p],
V1 − U1 =

p, if ν > p.
As long as the firm charges a positive sharing tariff, consumers with a high value of use may care distinctly more
about ownership than those with a low value of use.
Note also that for participants in the sharing market, the
payoff is independent of the need state.4
2.1.2

Early Consumption Phase

In C0 , an individual of type (θ, ν), who is in need
state s0 , has the option to purchase the product from a
4 Indeed,

U0 = U1 for ν ∈ [p, 1] and V0 = V1 for ν ∈
5 Alternatively, for a type-(θ, ν) agent to purchase, r ≤

would like to buy the item. Lastly, no agent type with
ν ≤ p̂ would ever buy the item because they could
not benefit from ownership more than by accessing the
product as a borrower through the sharing market. For
either threshold, ϑ00 or ϑ01 , to not exceed 1, i.e., for
some types to be willing to buy the product, its retail
price r would have to be less than δ min{p, ν}. But the
latter is not possible, since r > p is required for a functioning sharing market.5 This implies that no agent in
the low-need state would ever purchase the product.
In the high-need state, s0 = 1, consider first “highvalue” agents with values ν ≥ p. Acquisition of the
product is then interesting for the likelihood types
θ ≥ max{0,

r − p − δ p̂
} , ϑ11 .
δτ

[0, p̂); owners with ν ∈ (p̂, 1] lend only in the low-need state.
δ [p̂ + θ max {0, τ + min{0, ν − p}}] needs to hold, contradicting r > p.
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Hence, there are some buyers (i.e., ϑ11 ≤ 1) iff (i.e., if
and only if) the sharing price is bounded from below:
p ≥ r/(1 + δ) , p0 .
Conversely, all high-value agents buy (i.e., ϑ11 = 0) iff
p ≥ (r + δτ )/(1 + δ) , p1 .
To find ownership attractive, high-value agents need to
anticipate a sufficiently high sharing price, in comparison to the retail price. Their aggregate demand for ownership is

Ω11 =

0,
if p < p0 ,

(1 − p) 1 − ϑ211 /2, otherwise.

Consider now “medium-value” agents with values between the lower price bound p0 and the clearing price p
on the sharing market, so ν ∈ (p̂, p). To them purchasing the item is attractive iff

θ ≥ max{0,

r − ν − δ p̂
} , ϑ10 .
δ(ν − p̂)

As before, some of the agents purchase (i.e., ϑ10 ≤ 1),
as long as p > p0 , while all likelihood types are interested in ownership (i.e., ϑ10 = 0) iff ν ≥ r − δ p̂, which
also requires that p ≥ p1 . This leads to the aggregate
demand for ownership from medium-value agents:
Figure 1: Dynamic choice behavior with sharing.
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if p ≤ p0 ,
 0,
ΩA
,
if
p0 < p < p1 ,
=
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Ω10 , if p ≥ p1 ,

Taking into account that
Z

p

ϑ210 dν
p0

where we set
ΩA
10

Z

p

Z
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Z

p

θ dθ dν =

,
p0

ϑ10

p0

1 − ϑ210
dν
2

and

ΩB
10

,
=

6 Since p
7 For

Z r−δp̂
p − (r − δ p̂)
1 − ϑ210
+
dν
2
2
p0
Z
1 r−δp̂ 2
p − p0
−
ϑ10 dν.
2
2 p0

=


p0 − p̂ p − p0
+ (1 + δ) ×
δ2
p0 − p̂




p0 − p̂
p − p0
× 2 ln
+ (1 + δ)
,
p − p̂
p − p̂

the preceding expressions can be computed explicitly.6
It is interesting to observe that ownership by mediumvalue agents is an artefact produced by the existence of
a positive sharing tariff as well as agents that care about
the future.7
Combining the purchase decisions for high-value
and medium-value agents in their early consumption
phase yields the overall demand for the monopolist’s
goods in the presence of an active peer-to-peer market.

= r−δ p̂ implies p−p0 = δ(p0 − p̂) and p− p̂ = (1+δ)(p0 − p̂), one obtains ΩB
10 =

p−p0
2


− p0δ−p̂ 1 +

δ
2

−

1+δ
δ


ln(1 + δ) .

δ → 0+ or τ → 0+ , one obtains that Ω10 → 0.
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Proposition 1. Given p, τ, r with 0 ≤ τ ≤ r, the ag- 2.2.1 Supply
gregate demand for ownership in the (viable) sharing
The supply in the sharing market consists of owners who
economy is Ω = Ω10 + Ω11 .
are happy to lend when they find themselves in a lowThis demand is based on the agents’ choice behavior need state (s = 0). In a high-need state (s = 1),
1
1
(see Fig. 1), which can be summarized as follows.
owners with values ν < p̂ (who are a priori willing to
Lemma 2. In C0 , a type-(θ, ν) agent in the high-need lend) do not exist, as owners’ lowest value is p0 ≥ p̂.
Thus, the sharing supply becomes
state s0 = 1 becomes an owner iff
θ≥

max{0, r − min{ν, p} − δ p̂}
, θ0 (p, ν);
δ(τ + min{0, ν − p})

otherwise, if ν ≥ p, he borrows the item on the sharing
market. In any other event, the agent does nothing.

Z

1

Z

!

1

(1 − θ)θ dθ

S=
p0

dν.

θ0 (p,ν)

Aggregating owners with ν ∈ [p, 1] yields the supply
The existence of a population that borrows in the

Z 1 Z 1
early consumption phase (i.e., whether θ0 (p, p) > 0) de(1
−
θ)θ
dθ
dν
S
=
11
pends on the price in the sharing market. For p0 < p <
ϑ11
p
p1 , agents with low likelihood types θ prefer gaining


ϑ3
1 ϑ211
access to the product via sharing to an ownership com−
+ 11 ,
= (1 − p)
6
2
3
mitment. In the absence of a sharing tariff, i.e., when
τ = 0 the last condition becomes vacuous, and there is
no sharing activity at all in the early consumption phase. while owners with ν ∈ [p0 , p] constitute a supply of

Z p Z 1
2.2 Sharing Equilibrium
S10 =
(1 − θ)θ dθ dν
p0
ϑ10

Let r > 0 be a given retail price and τ ∈ [0, p] be a sharif p ≤ p0 ,
 0,
ing tariff. Assuming that the sharing market clears, the
A
S10
, if p0 < p < p1 ,
=
 B
price p in the sharing market must be such that demand
S10 , if p ≥ p1 ,
for the shared product equals the supply.8 The potential
suppliers in the sharing market include all agents in their
where, using the abbreviation λ , (p0 − p̂)/τ ,10
late consumption phase C1 who opted for ownership in

Z p 2
their early consumption phase C0 . Based on Prop. 1 and
ϑ10
ϑ310
p − p0
A
La. 2, the demand for ownership is
−
−
dν,
S10 =
6
2
3
!
p0
Z 1 Z 1


(1 − λ)τ
3
2
(1 + δ)2 λτ
Ω=
θ dθ dν = Ω10 + Ω11 ,
=
1− 2 − 3 −
×
p0
θ0 (p,ν)
6
δ
δ
δ3


5 + 2δ − (1 + δ)λ
where ν = p0 is the lowest valuation of an agent (with
ln(λ) + (1 − λ)
.
θ = 1) purchasing the item. As implied by our discus6
sion of the demand for ownership, the nature of the equilibrium depends on whether the sharing price is “high” This yields the sharing supply, S = S10 + S11 , for any
(with p > p1 ) or “moderate” (with p0 ≤ p ≤ p1 ).9 The combination of retail price and sharing tariff which alfollowing result helps focus the analysis of the sharing low for an active (i.e., positive-trading-volume) peer-toequilibrium, effectively excluding any high-price sce- peer exchange in the secondary market.
nario in equilibrium; see App. A.1 for a proof.
Lemma 4. For any (r, τ ) ≥ 0 with active sharing marLemma 3. For any (r, τ ) ≥ 0, a sharing market is acA
ket, the sharing supply is S = S10
+ S11 .
tive (i.e., it has positive trading volume) iff r ∈ (0, 1+δ)
and τ ≤ p. The clearing price p of an active sharing
The sharing supply collapses whenever the sharing
market is moderate, i.e., it lies in the interval [p0 , p1 ].
tariff τ exceeds the equilibrium price p in the market
The preceding result implies that in the special case
without sharing tariff (for τ = 0), the market price is
equal to p0 , i.e., p = r/(1 + δ) as in Weber (2016a).
It also allows us to concentrate on the interesting case
where p ∈ [p0 , p1 ].

because this would entail a negative absolute markup p̂.
Naturally, the equilibrium price also depends on τ , so
that checking whether τ exceeds p in equilibrium involves solving the corresponding fixed-point problem,
which is discussed below.

8 In

practice, there may be supply-demand imbalances (Weber 2014a,b; Razeghian and Weber 2015).
“low” sharing prices (with p < p0 ), the demand for ownership vanishes, thus also disabling any peer-to-peer aftermarket.
10 Further analytical details (e.g., on obtaining S B , which by La. 3 is not relevant in equilibrium) are provided in App. A.
10
9 For
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2.2.2

Demand

By increasing the sharing tariff beyond the equilibrium market price, the monopolist can effectively disNon-owners like to access a product on the sharing marable the sharing market (i.e., induce a “sharing shutket whenever they are in a high-need state (in either condown”) because in that case the absolute markup p̂ besumption phase) and their contingent use value exceeds
comes negative, thus negating any economic incentives
the market price (so ν ≥ p). The corresponding sharing
peers may have had to make their goods available for
demand from the mature generation in C1 amounts to
collaborative consumption. The question of which pre!
Z θ0 (p,ν)
Z 1 Z 1
cise bound this implies on the sharing tariff is answered
by solving the fixed-point problem τ = p∗ (r, τ ), disθ2 dθ dν,
(1 − θ)θ dθ +
D1 =
0
0
p
cussed in the next section because it is central to the solution of the monopolist’s profit-maximization problem.
while for the early generation in C0 it is
!
Z
Z
θ0 (p,ν)

1

θ dθ

D0 =
p

dν.

0

Hence, for p0 < p < p1 , we obtain


1 ϑ211
ϑ3
D = D0 + D1 = (1 − p)
+
+ 11 .
6
2
3
2.2.3

Market Clearing

For a sharing price p ∈ [p0 , p1 ], supply equals demand
(S = D; i.e., lenders = borrowers in Fig. 1) iff
A
S10
= (1 − p)ϑ211 .

Since, by definition, the type threshold ϑ11 is
ϑ11 = 1 −

(1 + δ)(1 − λ)
(1 + δ)λ − 1
=
,
δ
δ

the sharing price becomes a function of λ and τ :

2
δ
A
p=1−
S10
, h(λ, τ ).
(1 + δ)λ − 1
From this we can determine λ = ϕ(r, τ ) by solving a
fixed-point problem (using the definition of λ):


1
r
λ=1−
h(λ, τ ) −
, ϕ(r, τ );
τ
1+δ

3

3.1

Optimal Pricing
Active Sharing

With an active peer-to-peer market, the firm has two
sources of revenue: the sales of the product and the rent
from the sharing tariff on sharing transactions. Thus, its
profits are of the form
Π = (r − c) Ω + τ D,
subject to the equilibrium sharing price p = p∗ (r, τ ) in
Prop. 2. As already pointed out, for the sharing market to stay liquid, the sharing tariff τ cannot exceed the
equilibrium sharing price. This implies a discontinuity
at the boundary τ = p∗ (r, τ ) in the monopolist’s profit
function. We also note that for a zero sharing tariff, we
can revert to simpler optimality conditions to obtain an
optimal retail price.12 The power of the sharing tariff is
that it allows the monopolist to syphon off surplus from
the sharing market at a point where established owners
(in C1 ) have observed their need states. For any given
sharing tariff τ , the firm’s profit has an interior optimum r∗ (τ ) ∈ (c, 1 + δ) because a price at the boundary would lead to zero profits. Thus, r∗ (τ ) can be determined from a (modified) monopoly pricing rule (see,
e.g., Tirole 1988, p. 66).

this finally yields the equilibrium sharing price p∗ as a Proposition 3. In an active sharing market, for a given
function of r and τ .11
sharing tariff τ ∈ [0, p∗ ], the optimal retail price r∗ (τ )
satisfies the following inverse-elasticity rule for sharing:
Proposition 2. For any (r, τ ) ≥ 0 with active
∗
sharing market, the equilibrium sharing price p =
1 + (τ /r)(D∗ /Ω∗ )ε̂
r−c
=
,
h(ϕ(r, τ ), τ ) lies in the interval [p0 , p1 ].
r
ε
A straightforward analysis reveals a monotone de∗
∗
of
pendence of the equilibrium sharing price on the mo- where ε , −rΩr /Ω is the own-price elasticity
∗
the
equilibrium
demand
for
ownership
(Ω
(r,
τ
)
,
nopolist’s choice variables.
Ω(p∗ (r, τ ), r, τ )) and ε̂ , rDr∗ /D∗ is the cross-price
Lemma 5. Provided there is an active sharing mar- elasticity of the equilibrium demand in the sharing market, the equilibrium sharing price p∗ is increasing ket (D∗ (r, τ ) , D(p∗ (r, τ ), r, τ )) with respect to the
in (r, τ ) ≥ 0.
retail price.13
11 Although

a closed-form solution is available, it has been omitted here due to its complexity.
τ = 0, the optimal retail price is r0∗ = (1 + δ + c)/2 resulting in the profit Π∗0 = (1 + δ − c)2 /(8(1 + δ)); see Weber (2016a).
13 The subscripts denote partial derivatives.
12 For
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ally maximizing any continuously differentiable function on an interval (here [0, τ̄ ]) have been recently developed by Weber (2016b).
Proposition 4. The monopolist’s optimal product offering (r∗∗ , τ ∗∗ ) is such that r∗∗ = r∗ (τ ∗ ), and τ ∗∗ solves
max {(r∗ (τ ) − c) Ω∗ (r∗ (τ ), τ ) + τ D∗ (r∗ (τ ), τ )} .

τ ∈[0,τ̄ ]

The preceding result implies the equilibrium price
on the (by construction active) sharing market:
p∗∗ = p∗ (r∗∗ , τ ∗∗ ) ∈ [p0 , p1 ].
For sufficiently small production cost it has been recently shown that without sharing tariff, i.e., for τ = 0
and c ≥ 0 small, the firm prefers no sharing to sharing
(Weber 2016a), even when it has control over a product’s durability (Razeghian and Weber 2016). Accordingly, we examine next the possibility of deliberate sabotage of the sharing market by the monopolist’s leveraging its control of shareability.

3.2

Figure 2: Equilibrium prices and profits (δ = 0.3).
Because an active peer-to-peer market requires the
sharing price to be less than the retail price, a forteriori the sharing tariff is also less than the retail price. In
addition, the transaction volume in the sharing market
is bounded from above by the number of goods owned
in the economy (which is given by the equilibrium demand for ownership in our model). Hence, the factor
(τ /r)(D∗ /Ω∗ ) < 1, limiting the influence of the crossprice elasticity (ε̂) of the sharing demand. The latter
becomes irrelevant for τ = 0 when the optimality condition specializes to the standard monopoly pricing rule
for sharing markets (see footnote 12).
Substituting the retail price r∗ (τ ), the firm’s equilibrium profit depends only on τ and needs to be maximized on the interval [0, τ̄ ], where the upper bound for
the sharing tariff is determined (implicitly) by the fixedpoint problem

Sharing Shutdown

In the event the sharing tariff is too high (so it would
exceed the equilibrium sharing price), the sharing market becomes illiquid and breaks down. The peer-to-peer
market is therefore not accessible, and consumers need
to make “isolated” consumption decisions. This situation reverts to the case without sharing examined by
Weber (2016a). One can backward-induct ownership
decisions over the agents’ lifecycles and derive the ownership demand Ω̂i in Ci for i ∈ {0, 1}:


ln(r) − ln(1 + δ) r
(r − δ)2 − 1
−
,
Ω̂0 =
2δ 2
δ
δ
and

1−r
}.
6
The total demand for ownership in the absence of a sharing market is
Ω̂ = Ω̂0 + Ω̂1 ,
Ω̂1 = max{0,

for any given retail price r ∈ (0, 1 + δ). Correspondingly, the firm’s no-sharing profit is
Π̂ = (r − c)Ω̂.
For sufficiently small cost, c ∈ [0, 1/2], the optimal
retail price without sharing can be obtained in closed
form,
1
c
r̂∗ =
+ ,
3ρ 2
resulting in the optimal no-sharing profit

τ̄ = p∗ (r∗ (τ̄ ), τ̄ ).
Necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for glob-

Π̂∗ =

(2 − 3ρc)2
,
36ρ
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1
6

1
δ



ln(1+δ)
δ



∈ [(7/6) − ln(2), 2/3] with sharing but without a sharing tariff. For low-cost
products, τ ∈ (0, τ̄ ] is still not optimal, but the firm
is a decreasing function of δ ∈ (0, 1].
can use an excessive sharing tariff to trigger a sharing
shutdown, using its control over the shareability of its
products to disable the peer-to-peer secondary market.

where ρ ,

+

1−

4

Implications for Product Design

Using the sharing tariff τ as an additional price instrument, the monopolist has the option to extract contingent rents from low-need owners or else to disable the
sharing market altogether. As shown in Fig. 2, the benefits from extracting “shareability rents” can be significant, possibly justifying an investment in proprietary
technology that enables aftermarket control.14 The firm
would want to invest in technologies that ensure its control over the owner’s sharing activities. Thus, to seek the
extra rent a monopolist would want to make a one-time
investment I of (at most) the net present value of the
perpetuity of the excess profit. On the other hand, any
per-period cost γ (e.g., monitoring, accounting, and administration) related to gaining and maintaining shareability control would need to be compared to the perperiod benefit, so that in total
I+

Π∗∗ − Π∗0
γ
≤
,
1−δ
1−δ

for all δ ∈ (0, 1).15 In order to fully appropriate the
shareability rent the firm may need to run its own secondary sharing market. Yet, because of the critical mass
already attained by existing sharing platforms, it may
need to limit its take so as to accommodate the commissions charged by third-party intermediaries and still
leave sufficient incentives for owners on the table to
share their products.
Figure 3: Equilibrium prices and profits (δ = 0.6).

5
3.3

Implementation

Figs. 2 and 3 show the optimal profits and prices for
δ = 0.3 and δ = 0.6. In the absence of shareability
control (i.e., for τ = 0), the company would prefer no
sharing to sharing. A positive sharing tariff τ ∈ (0, τ̄ ]
can improve the monopolist’s profit for impatient (lowδ) customers over sharing with τ = 0 (i.e., without
tariff) and over no sharing. In this situation, the extra
revenue from the secondary market provides a positive
incentive for the firm to support collaborative consumption of its products. By contrast, for impatient (highδ) customers and high-cost products the firm is best off

Conclusion

Controlling the shareability of products allows a company to align its pricing instruments closer with consumer needs, as they arise. Depending on its production
cost and the nature of consumers, it can be optimal to
omit a sharing tariff (τ = 0), or else to use τ > 0 in
order to either extract a shareability rent from peer-topeer transactions (τ = p) or to shut down the sharing
market altogether (τ > p) removing owners’ economic
incentive to offer their products to peers. The last option
transposes the manufacturer to a situation without sharing that tends to maximize profits for low-cost products
and sufficiently patient (non-myopic) customers. In-

14 As usual “rent seeking,” the expected benefit from controlling shareability justifies spending some (or even all) of it in order to attain it
(Tullock 1980), resulting possibly in the dissipation of the entire shareability rent.
15 For δ = 1, i.e., when there is no discounting, then the firm would want to spend whatever it takes (I ≤ ∞) to gain control of the
shareability of its products, as long as it yields a positive per-period benefit (net of the per-period cost γ).
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deed, without sharing, the product price is lower and
demand for ownership is relatively high.
The second option, optimal for relatively impatient
customers, is for the manufacturer to charge a sharing
tariff τ = p that extracts all rent from the secondary
market without shutting it down altogether. Because this
option relies, in our theoretical model, on the willingness of owners to share in a low-need state even when
obtaining a zero absolute markup, the recommendation
is not exactly robust with respect to even small misperceptions or perturbations of the model. The conclusion in this regime is more of an indication that a
positive sharing tariff—while maintaining a liquid sharing market—can be profitable for the firm (see Fig. 2),
despite the fact that the primary effect of the positive
sharing tariff is to reduce demand for ownership and decrease the retail price.16 Indeed, its secondary effect is to
increase the sharing price narrowing the gap between retail price r (i.e., the price on the primary market) and the
sharing price p (i.e., the price on the secondary market).
Finally, for high-cost products and sufficiently patient
products it is interesting to note that the firm’s optimal
sharing tariff τ is zero (see Fig. 3): even though it has
full control over the shareability of its products it is in
its own best interest to not exercise it at all.

Appendix A: Analytical Details
A.1 Moderate Sharing Price
To prove that the sharing price p needs to lie in the interval [p0 , p1 ],
assume that p > p1 , which implies, by virtue of Ω10 = ΩB
10 , the
demand of ownership
Ω=


1
1 − (1 − p)ϑ211 − p0 − β(p0 − p̂) ,
2

with the constant coefficient


2
δ
1+δ
β,
1+ −
ln(1 + δ) ∈ (0, 3 − 4 ln(2)).
δ
2
δ
The sharing supply by medium-value owners is
B
S10
=

p − p0
−
6

Z

r−δ p̂



p0

ϑ210
ϑ3
− 10
2
3


dν.

To compute the relevant integrals, it is convenient to set
Λ,

r − (1 + δ)p̂
= (1 + δ)
ν − p̂



p0 − p̂
ν − p̂


,

whence (omitting the constants in indefinite integrals):
Z

ϑ210
ν
ν − p̂
dν = 2 −
2
2δ
δ2




Λ2
+ Λ ln(ν − p̂) ,
2

and
Z
16 In

ϑ310
ν
ν − p̂
dν = − 3 +
3
3δ
δ3



Λ2 −


Λ3
+ Λ ln(ν − p̂) .
6

Note that Λ|ν=r−δp̂ = 1 and Λ|ν=p0 = 1 + δ. The two preceding
integrals, taken between the bounds of p0 and r − δ p̂, evaluate to


p0 − p̂
δ
ln(1 + δ)
1 + − (1 + δ)
δ
2
δ
and



δ
δ2
ln(1 + δ)
p0 − p̂
−1
−
+
+
(1
+
δ)
,
δ2
2
6
δ
respectively. We therefore obtain


1
τ
B
S10
= α(p − p0 ) − α −
τ = − α (p0 − p̂) ,
6
6
for p ≥ p1 , where
α,



1+δ
δ
ln(1 + δ)
1 + − (1 + δ)
.
2
δ
2
δ

It is 1/6 < α ≤ 3 − 4 ln(2) ≈ 0.2274 for δ ∈ (0, 1]. Combining
this with the earlier findings yields the sharing supply:
S=

1 − p0
1
αr
− α̂ (p0 − p̂) = −
+ α̂(p − τ ),
6
6
1+δ

where α̂ , α − (1/6) > 0 and p ≥ p1 . The supply in the sharing market is decreasing in the retail price and the sharing tariff, and
it is increasing in the sharing price. On the other side of the market,
the demand in a high-price regime stems exclusively from agents with
need-state realizations s0 = 0 and s1 = 1, so

Z 1 Z 1
1−p
.
D=
(1 − θ)θ dθ dν =
6
p
0
Equating supply and demand (S = D) implies a linear dependence of
the market price on retail price and sharing tariff:
 
 
r
α̂
α̂
p∗ (r, τ ) =
+
τ = p0 +
τ,
1+δ
α
α
where α̂ , α − (1/6) > 0. However, the assumption p∗ (r, τ ) > p1
implies that (α̂/α) > δ/(1 + δ), which does not hold for any δ ∈
(0, 1]. Thus, by contradiction of the counterfactual we obtain that the
clearing price of an active sharing market must be “moderate” in the
sense that it lies in the interval [p0 , p1 ].

A.2 Supply at a Moderate Sharing Price
At the moderate sharing price p ∈ [p0 , p1 ], the supply from mediumvalue owners is

Z p 2
ϑ3
ϑ10
p − p0
A
−
− 10 dν,
S10
=
6
2
3
p0
as noted in the main text. Using the expressions for the indefinite integrals in App. A.1, between the bounds p0 and p, one obtains



Z p 2
ϑ10
p − p0 1
(1 + δ)2 p0 − p̂
dν =
+
2
δ
2
2
τ
p0 2

 

p0 − p̂
p0 − p̂
+ (1 + δ)
ln
p − p0
τ

τ 1−λ
=
+ (1 + δ)λ ln(λ)
δ2
2

(1 + δ)2
+
λ(1 − λ) ,
2
and
Z p
p0

ϑ310
dν
3

=


τ
1−λ
−
− (1 + δ)λ ln(λ)
δ3
3


1+δ
− (1 + δ)2 λ(1 − λ) 1 −
(1 + λ)
,
6

where we recall that λ = (p0 − p̂)/τ . This implies the expression for
A given in the main text.
the supply S10

practice, a sharing tariff strictly below the sharing price (leaving a “robustness margin”) may help avoid inadvertent sharing shutdowns.
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